1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 SUZANNE MUELLER, a citizen of the State Case No. 9 of Washington, DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF REMOVAL 10 Plaintiff, PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, 1446, 128 (b) 11 v. 12 MOVE, INC., a citizen of the States of California and Delaware, 13 Defendant. 14 15 TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF 16 WASHINGTON AND TO PLAINTIFF SUZANNE MUELLER AND HER ATTORNEY 17 **OF RECORD:** 18 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant Move, Inc. ("Defendant" or "Move") hereby 19 removes the above-titled action from the Superior Court of the State of Washington for the 20 County of King ("King County Superior Court") to the United States District Court for the 21 Western District of Washington, asserting original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(a) 22 (Diversity Jurisdiction) and removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sections 1441(a)-(b) and 1446 23 and this Court's Local Rule 101. Move states that removal is proper for the following reasons: 24 25 26 SEYFARTH SHAW LLP

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PLEADINGS, PROCESS, AND PROCEEDINGS IN STATE COURT

- 1. Plaintiff Suzanne Mueller ("Plaintiff" or "Mueller") has commenced this action against Move in King County Superior Court by serving a summons ("Summons") and complaint ("Complaint") on Move in California. A copy of the Summons, Complaint, and proof of service of the Summons and Complaint are attached hereto as Attachments 1, 2, and 3, respectively, and to the concurrently filed Declaration of Molly Gabel ("Gabel Decl.") at Exhibit A.
- 2. Mueller served the Summons and Complaint on Move on August 18, 2020 without filing the Complaint in King County Superior Court. (Attachment 3; Gabel Decl. ¶ 3.)
- 3. On September 3, 2020, Move served its Notices of Appearances on Mueller. (Gabel Decl. ¶ 4, Exhibit B.)
- 4. On September 3, 2020, Move demanded, pursuant to Washington State Court Rules, Superior Court Civil Rules 3(a) (CR 3(a)), that Mueller file the Complaint in King County Superior Court. (Gabel Decl. ¶ 5, Exhibit C.)
- 5. As of the date of this Notice of Removal, upon information and belief, Mueller has not filed the Complaint in King County Superior Court. (Gabel Decl. ¶ 7.)
- 6. Attachments 1, 2, and 3 hereto and Exhibits B and C to the Declaration of Molly Gabel constitute all pleadings, processes, and documents served on, or filed by either party in this matter.
- 7. The Complaint alleges claims under Washington law, including (1) negligent retention; (2) negligent supervision; (3) sexual harassment, age discrimination, sex discrimination, and retaliation under the Washington Law Against Discrimination; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (6) wrongful discharge; and (7) retaliation. (Attachment 2, Cmplt. ¶¶ 4.1-10.6.) Through the Complaint, Mueller seeks back pay with prejudgment interest, compensation for past and future pecuniary losses (including out-of-pocket expenses), past and future non-pecuniary losses (e.g., emotional

pain, suffering, anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, damage to reputation), and attorneys' fees, among other forms of relief. (Attachment 2, Cmplt. at Prayer for Relief at 3-7.)

8. Move denies that it owes anything by the Complaint, but treats the Complaint's allegations as true for purpose of this Notice of Removal only.

TIMELINESS OF REMOVAL

- 9. A defendant has 30 days after service to file a Notice of Removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). The time for filing of a Notice of Removal begins to run when a party has been formally served with the summons and complaint under applicable state law "setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based." *Id.*; *Murphy Bros., Inc. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.*, 526 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1999) (holding that "a named defendant's time to remove is triggered by simultaneous service of the summons and complaint").
- 10. The service of process which triggers the 30-day period to remove is governed by state law. *City of Clarksdale v. BellSouth Telecomms, Inc.*, 428 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 2005) ("Although federal law requires defendant to file a removal motion within thirty days of service, the term 'service of process' is defined by state law.). Under Washington law a civil action is commenced by service of a summons and complaint or by filing a complaint. *See, e.g., Melvin v. Kingsolver*, Case No. C12-5401 RJB, 2012 WL 13026632 (W.D.Wash. June 12, 2012) (citing RCW 4.28.020)).
- 11. This Notice of Removal is timely because it is filed within 30 days of service of the Summons and Complaint on Move on August 18, 2020.

JURISDICTION BASED ON DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP

12. The Court has original jurisdiction of this action under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(a)(1). As set forth below, this action is removable pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(a) and (b) because the amount in controversy exceeds \$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and the lawsuit is between citizens of different states.

Jurisdiction Based on Amount in Controversy

- 13. While Move denies any liability as to Mueller's claims, the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied because the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum of \$75,000. *See, e.g., Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins.*, 102 F.3d 398, 403-04 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he defendant must provide evidence establishing that it is 'more likely than not' that the amount in controversy exceeds [the threshold] amount.") (citations omitted); *Lewis v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co.*, No. 3:15-CV-05275- RBL, 2015 WL 4430971, at *2 (W.D.Wash. July 20, 2015) (what ultimately matters is the amount put into controversy by the complaint, "not what the a defendant will actually owe") (internal citations and quotations omitted).
- 14. As explained by the Ninth Circuit, "the amount-in-controversy inquiry in the removal context is not confined to the face of the complaint." *Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that the Court may consider facts presented in the removal petition). When the amount in controversy is not apparent from the face of the complaint, a defendant may state underlying facts supporting its assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. *See Gaus v. Miles, Inc.*, 980 F.2d 564, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1992).
- 15. In determining the amount in controversy, the Court must consider the aggregate of damages and attorneys' fees. *See Galt G/S v. JSS Scandinavia*, 142 F.3d 1150, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1998).
- 16. Further, in determining the amount in controversy at the time of removal, the Court is not limited to the amount of damages incurred as of the time of removal, but may look forward in time to damages that can be recovered in the future. *See Chavez v. JP Morgan Chase & Co.*, 888 F.3d 413, 417-18 (9th Cir. 2018) ("That the amount in controversy is assessed at the time of removal does not mean that the mere futurity of certain classes of damages precludes them from being part of the amount in controversy. In sum the amount in controversy includes all relief claimed at the time of removal to which the plaintiff would be entitled if she prevails.").

17. Here, considered together, the damages sought by Mueller, along with attorneys							
fees that might be awarded if she prevails, establishes that the amount in controversy exceeds							
\$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, as required by 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(a). Pursuant to							
Local Rule 101(a), Move sets forth below the basis for its good-faith belief that the amount in							
controversy exceeds \$75,000:							
18. Backpay and Pecuniary Losses. Move employed Mueller from December 14,							
2015 until June 5, 2020. Declaration of Terry Kontonickas filed concurrently herewith							
("Kontonickas Decl.") at ¶ 7. As a result of her alleged wrongful termination, Mueller seeks to							
be made whole with "back pay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial"							

and "compensation for past and future pecuniary losses." (Attachment 2, Cmplt. at Prayer for

- 19. At the time Move terminated her employment, Mueller was a full-time salaried employee, making \$243,262.65 in regular salary annually (\$4,678.13 weekly, or \$116.9532 hourly, based on a 40 hour work week). (Kontonickas Decl. ¶ 9.) Given that Mueller alleges she was wrongfully terminated, Mueller already has incurred 15 weeks of lost salary totaling \$70,171.95 (\$4678.13 per week X 15 weeks (June 6, 2020 to September 17, 2020)) since her last day of employment on June 5, 2020.
- 20. Assuming this matter is resolved at trial in the 19.3 month median time period from filing to disposition in this Court (*i.e.*, on or about April 25, 2022),¹ and Mueller remains unemployed for a total of 98 weeks (June 6, 2020 through April 25, 2022), Mueller's lost salary alone would equal \$458,456.74 (\$4678.13 per week X 98 weeks (June 6, 2020 through April 25, 2022)).

Relief (3) and (4).)

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¹ Based on the Judicial Caseload Profile for the Western District of Washington obtained from the United States Courts' official website, the median time from filing of a lawsuit through a disposition at trial in a civil matter is 19.3 months. *See* Table C-5, U.S. District Courts -- Median Time Intervals from Filing to Disposition of Civil Cases Terminated, by District and Method of Disposition, During 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2020 at Column K, Row 93 (available at: http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fjcs_c5_0331.2020.xlsx).

- 21. Mueller also routinely received, among other forms of compensation, bonus payments in addition to her annual regular salary. (Kontonickas Decl. ¶ 10.) She received bonus payments in each of 2017, 2018, and 2019, with the minimum annual bonus payment during that period totaled over \$39,000. (*Id*). Accordingly, the estimated amounts of back pay and compensation described above in paragraphs 19 and 20 actually underestimate the amount of back pay and compensation at issue through trial in this matter.
- 22. **Emotional Distress Damages**. Mueller also claims damages for emotional distress. (Attachment 2, Cmplt. at ¶¶ 7.1-8.4, Prayer for Relief at (5).) A review of jury verdicts in Washington demonstrates that emotional distress awards in Washington Law Against Discrimination cases meet and exceed \$75,000. *See, e.g., Bunch v. King Cty. Dep't of Youth Servs.*, 155 Wash.2d 165, 180 (2005) ("[E]vidence of emotional distress [was] limited, but . . . sufficient to support an award of noneconomic damages" in the amount of \$260,000" in discrimination case); *Martini v. Boeing Co.*, 137 Wash.2d 357, 362 (1999) (noting jury award of \$75,000 for pain, suffering, and emotional distress in discrimination case).
- 23. **Attorneys' Fees.** Mueller also claims that she is entitled to attorneys' fees. (Attachment 2, Cmplt. at ¶ 1.1, Prayer for Relief (6).) Attorneys' fees are properly considered in calculating the amount in controversy for purposes of removal on grounds of diversity jurisdiction. *See, e.g., Galt* G/S v. JSS Scandinavia, 142 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 1998) (claims for statutory attorneys' fees to be included in amount in controversy, regardless of whether such an award is discretionary or mandatory).
- 24. Move anticipates depositions being taken in this case, and that ultimately, Move will file a motion for summary judgment. Based on defense counsel's experience, attorneys' fees in employment discrimination cases often exceed \$75,000. In this regard, it is more likely than not that the fees will exceed \$75,000 through discovery and a summary judgment disposition, and the fees would certainly exceed \$75,000 if the case proceeds to trial. (Gabel Decl. ¶ 8.)

- 25. **Mueller's Settlement Demand.** On or about June 1, 2020, Mueller demanded \$304,078.33 in regular salary alone, among other demands, to settle this dispute. (Kontonickas Decl. ¶ 11.) This Court considers settlement demands when determining reasonable estimates of the amount in controversy. *See, e.g., Flores v. Safeway, Inc.*, No. C19-0825-JCC, 2019 WL 4849488, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 1, 2019); *Babcock v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co.*, No. 12-CV-5093-TOR, 2012 WL 3862031, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 5, 2012) (*citing Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc.*, 281 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir.2002)).
- 26. As paragraphs 18 through 25 demonstrate, more than \$75,000 is at issue in this matter. Based on the foregoing estimates, Mueller's allegations and prayer for relief in the Complaint, and her settlement demand, Move has shown that Mueller seeks damages within the jurisdictional authority of this Court.

Jurisdiction Based on Diversity of Citizenship

- Mueller's Citizenship. For diversity purposes, a person is a "citizen" of the state in which the person is domiciled. *See Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd.*, 704 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1983). A person's domicile is the place where the person resides with the intent to remain indefinitely. *See Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co.*, 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). Residence is *prima facie* evidence of domicile. *See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Dyer*, 19 F.3d 514, 520 (10th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he place of residence is *prima facie* [evidence of] domicile.").
- 28. Mueller is and, at all times since the commencement of this lawsuit has been, a resident and citizen of the State of Washington. Mueller alleges in the Complaint that she "is a citizen and resident of the United States and resides in King County, Washington." (Attachment 2, Cmplt. at ¶ 3.2.) Additionally, Mueller's home address while she was employed at Move was in Kirkland, Washington. (Kontonickas Decl. ¶ 12.)
- 29. Accordingly, Mueller was at all relevant times, and still is, a citizen of the State of Washington.

but not of Washington. There is complete diversity amongst the parties.

Mueller is a citizen of Washington. Move is a citizen of Delaware and California,

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36. Because diversity of citizenship exists between Mueller and Move, and the matter in controversy between the parties is in excess of \$75,000, this Court has original jurisdiction of the action pursuant to 28 U.S. C. Section 1332(a)(1). This action is therefore a proper action for removal to this Court.

VENUE

37. Venue lies in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1441, 1446(a), and 128(b). Mueller originally brought this action in King County Superior Court, which is located in this District. Therefore, this action is properly removed to this Court because it is the "district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

NOTICE OF REMOVAL

- 38. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1446(d), Move will give prompt written notice of the filing of this Notice of Removal to Mueller.
- 39. Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1446(d), once Mueller files the Complaint in King County Superior Court, Move promptly will file a copy of this Notice of Removal with the Clerk of King County Superior Court.
 - 40. This Notice of Removal will be served on counsel for Mueller.
- 41. In compliance with 28 U.S.C. Section 1446 and Local Rule 101(c), Move will, within 14 days after filing this Notice of Removal, file with the Clerk of this Court black-on-white copes of any and all additional records and proceedings in King County Superior Court, together with Move's verification that they are true and complete copies of all the records and proceedings in the state court proceeding, or if no such additional records or proceedings exist, a statement verifying as much.
- 42. Defendant Move, Inc. is the sole defendant in the Mueller's Complaint and consents to removal.

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43. Therefore, Move gives notice that the above-titled case against it in King County 1 2 Superior Court has been removed from King County Superior Court to this Court. 3 PRAYER FOR REMOVAL 4 WHEREFORE, Move prays that the above-titled action be removed from the Superior 5 Court of Washington in and for King County to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. 6 7 DATED this 17th day of September, 2020. 8 SEYFARTH SHAW LLP Attorneys for Move, Inc. 9 By: s/ Molly Gabel 10 Molly Gabel, WSBA 47023 Amanda J. Hailey, WSBA 51166 11 999 Third Avenue, Ste. 3000 Seattle, WA 98104 12 P: (206) 946-4923 F: (206) 260-8839 13 mgabel@seyfarth.com ahailey@seyfarth.com 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby declare that on this 17th day of September, 2020, I caused a copy of <i>Move</i> ,
3	Inc.'s Notice of Removal to be sent by Federal Express and emailed to the following:
4	Robin Williams Phillips
5	LASHER HOLZAPFEL SPERRY & EBBERSON, P.L.L.C.
6	2600 Two Union Square 601 Union Street
7 8	Seattle, WA 98101 Email: phillips@lasher.com
9	DATED this 17th day of September, 2020.
0	s/ Molly Gabel
1	Molly Gabel, Attorney for Move, Inc.
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NOTICE OF REMOVAL - 11

SEYFARTH SHAW LLP Attorneys at Law 999 Third Avenue Suite 4700 Seattle, WA 98104-4041 (206) 946-4910

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON COUNTY OF KING

SUZANNE MUELLER,

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Plaintiff,

SUMMONS

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MOVE, INC.

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Defendants.

TO THE DEFENDANTS: A lawsuit has been started against you in the aboveentitled court by plaintiff. Plaintiff's claim is stated in the written complaint, a copy of which is served upon you with this summons.

In order to defend against this lawsuit, you must respond to the complaint by stating your defense, in writing, and serve a copy upon the undersigned attorney for the plaintiff within twenty (20) days after service of this summons (or within forty (40) days after service if you were served outside the state of Washington), excluding the day of service, or a default judgment may be entered against you without notice. A default judgment is one where plaintiff is entitled to what plaintiff asks for because you have not responded. If you serve a notice of

LASHER HOLZAPFEL SPERRY & EBBERSON ATTORNEYS AT LAW
2600 TWO UNION SQUARE
601 UNION STREET
SEATTLE WA 98101-4000
TELEPHONE 206 624-1230
Fax 206 340-2563

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appearance on the undersigned attorney, you are entitled to notice before a default judgment may be entered.

You may demand that the plaintiff file this lawsuit with the court. If you do so, the demand must be in writing and must be served upon the person signing this summons. Within 14 days after you serve the demand, the plaintiff must file this lawsuit with the court, or the service on you of this summons and complaint will be void.

If you wish to seek the advice of an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that your written response, if any, may be served on time.

This summons is issued pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 4.

DATED this 17th day of August, 2020.

LASHER HOLZAPFEL SPERRY & EBBERSON, P.L.L.C.

By <u>s/Robin Williams Phillip</u>
Robin Williams Phillips, WSBA #17947
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY

SUZANNE Z. MUELLER,

Plaintiff,

MOVE, INC.,

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Defendant.

NO.

COMPLAINT FOR NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION, NEGLIGENT RETENTION, NEGLIGENT AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, AGE DISCRIMINATION, RETALIATION, AND WRONGFUL DISCHARGE

COMES NOW plaintiff Suzanne Z. Mueller, by and through her attorneys, LASHER HOLZAPFEL SPERRY & EBBERSON, P.L.L.C., and for causes of action against the named defendant states and alleges as follows:

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1.1 This is an action under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, RCW 49.60 et seq.; RCW 49.52 et seq.; and Washington common law for declaratory injunctive relief compensatory and monetary damages, costs, and attorney's fees. Plaintiff alleges that defendant harassed and discriminated against her on the basis of sex and age. During the time she worked for defendant Move, Inc., plaintiff was employed as the Senior Vice President of Industry Relations. Defendant failed to provide plaintiff with a safe working environment and failed to adequately supervise employees, including but not limited to, The Chief Revenue Officer, Raymond Picard.



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1.2 Plaintiff further alleges that defendant committed the torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision and retention and wrongful discharge. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, compensatory damages and all other damages allowed by law, and payment of costs and attorney's fees.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 2.1 Plaintiff herein incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of plaintiff's Complaint as if set forth herein at length.
 - 2.2 This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to RCW 4.92.010 et seq.
 - 2.3 This action arises under RCW 49.60 et seq., and Washington State common law.
- 2.4 At all relevant times, defendant Move, Inc. is a Delaware Corporation doing business within King County in the State of Washington, employing eight or more employees.
- 2.5 At all relevant times the Executive Vice President of Sales, Raymond Picard, who was later promoted to Chief Revenue Officer, acted in a managerial and supervisory capacity on behalf of the Move, Inc.
- 2.6 All acts complained of herein were committed by defendant while doing business in King County, Washington.
 - 2.7 Declaratory injunctive and equitable relief is sought pursuant to RCW 49.60 et seq.
- 2.8 Costs and reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded pursuant to RCW 49.60.030 et seq., and other Washington statutes.

III. STATEMENT OF CLAIMS

- 3.1 Plaintiff herein incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of plaintiff's Complaint as if set forth herein at length.
- 3.2 Plaintiff Suzanne Z. Mueller had been employed by defendant Move, Inc. since December 14, 2015 as the Senior Vice President of Industrial Relations. She is a citizen and resident of the United States and resides in King County, Washington. Plaintiff is 56 years old.
- 3.3 At all times hereto, Move, Inc. was and is responsible for all acts committed by its agents, representatives, and employees.



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- 3.4 During her years of employment, plaintiff performed her duties well above expectation and had always received exceptional annual performance reviews.
- 3.5 At all material times hereto, the Chief Revenue Officer/the Executive Vice President of Sales, and the Executive Vice President of Software were in superior positions to plaintiff, and could and did supervise and direct her work activities.
- 3.6 During plaintiff's employment, the roles of Chief Revenue Officer/ Executive Vice President of Sales and the Executive Vice President of Software were held by men.
- 3.7 In 2016, after it became known that violent and sexual comments had been made by males at an industry event, the Senior Vice President of Sales, Raymond Picard, commented to the plaintiff "they were just being boys on a bus shooting the shit. Why do you want to penalize these guys for just a few random comments?"
- 3.8 In 2016, the Executive Vice President of Software said to plaintiff that "all field employees' cell phone expenses have been capped at the same amount, although I bet the women are going to ask for more because they talk more. Are you going to ask for more?"
- 3.9 In 2017, the Executive Vice President of Software said to plaintiff "What on earth does your family do with their mom traveling so much?"
- 3.10 The environment of harassment and discrimination was hostile and abusive towards women and unreasonably interfered with many female employees' work performance. Said environment created an intimidating, hostile, and offensive working environment.
- 3.11 In 2019, an international women's day event was held where a panel of executive women from several industries met to network and discuss current issues. Plaintiff was the representative who attended on behalf of the defendant. Following the event, the Chief Revenue Officer commented "this women's event and panel is meaningless and made the entire day a waste of work time."
- 3.12 In 2019, the Chief Revenue Office told plaintiff "I don't know how you could think to lose weight on the road with your travel schedule and your metabolism is clearly slowing down."

- 3.13 In 2019, a NAR Executive had been reported to the defendant for sexually harassing a female employee over dinner and at meetings. In response to the complaint, the Chief Executive Officer told plaintiff "but that's her job, and yours, to deal."
- 3.14 In 2019, the Chief Revenue Office told plaintiff "as a woman, you shouldn't walk anywhere outside the hotel after dark."
- 3.15 In the fall of 2019, a complaint was made by a female employee claiming that she had been sexually harassed in the workplace by the Vice President of National Association of Realtors, Chief Operating Officer, Ken Burlington. Plaintiff reported the harassment and supplied corroborating information to the Chief People Officer doing the investigation and to corporate legal counsel.
- **3.16** In 2017, in reviewing the plaintiff's expense reports, the Executive Vice President of Software said to the plaintiff "should I have to cover Tylenol on an expense report just because you got cramps or something?"
- 3.17 On May 4, 2020, plaintiff received notice that she had been chosen for layoff. She is one of the highest executive being laid off. It is believed and therefore averred that plaintiff's duties and responsibilities have been reassigned to a male employee.
- 3.18 Plaintiff was the subject of verbal, sexual innuendo and has suffered as a result of the sexually charged atmosphere.
- 3.19 The environment of harassment and discrimination was hostile and abusive towards women and unreasonably interfered with many female employees' work performance. Said environment created an intimidating, hostile, and offensive working environment.
- 3.20 All those persons participating in the harassment and discriminatory conduct directed towards the plaintiff and other similarly situated females held superior positions and management roles at Move, Inc. with immediate or successor authority over plaintiff.
- 3.21 Defendant took no effectual action to stop the harassment directed at women despite actual and/or constructive knowledge of such unlawful activity, and, in fact, often condoned such harassment.

- 3.22 Plaintiff found defendant's harassing conduct to be wholly unwelcome, and experienced substantial and enduring emotional distress as a direct result of defendant's conduct. Defendant acted in total disregard of the high probability of causing emotional distress to the plaintiff in that defendant knew, or should have known there was a high degree of probability that emotional distress would result to plaintiff from the harassment and discrimination and defendant acted in conscious disregard of those probable results.
- 3.23 The unlawful employment practices complained of in the above paragraphs were intentional and willful.
- 3.24 The unlawful employment practices complained of in the above paragraphs were done with malice or with reckless indifference to plaintiff's rights as protected by state laws.
- 3.25 Defendant had a duty to refrain from inflicting emotional distress upon the plaintiff, but negligently breached this duty. As a result of this breach of duty by defendant, plaintiff suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
- 3.26 Defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, thereby causing severe emotional distress to plaintiff. As a result of this breach of duty by defendant, plaintiff suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
- 3.27 Defendant Move, Inc. failed to act to eliminate the harassment, discrimination and retaliation at its facilities, and was negligent in its supervision and its retention of its supervisory employees and other employees, thus breaching a duty it owed to plaintiff. As a result of this breach of duty, plaintiff suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
- 3.28 As a result of defendant's conduct, plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer economic losses, mental anguish, pain and suffering, and other non-pecuniary losses.

IV. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: NEGLIGENT RETENTION

4.1 Plaintiff herein incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of plaintiff's Complaint as if set forth herein at length.

- **4.2** Defendant Move, Inc. breached its duty of care owed to plaintiff by failing to provide plaintiff with a safe working environment.
- 4.3 At all material times hereto, The Chief Revenue Officer/the Executive Vice President of Sales and the Executive Vice President of Software were employees of Move, Inc.
- 4.4 At all material times hereto, Move, Inc. knew or should have known of the inappropriate conduct, and that these employees were unfit for their positions.
- 4.5 As a direct and proximate result of Move, Inc.'s negligent retention of The Chief Revenue Officer/the Executive Vice President of Sales and the Executive Vice President of Software, plaintiff has been harmed in an amount to be proven at trial.

V. <u>SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION</u>

- 5.1 Plaintiff herein incorporates the foregoing paragraphs to plaintiff's Complaint as if set forth herein at length.
- 5.2 At all material times hereto, The Chief Revenue Officer/the Executive Vice President of Sales and the Executive Vice President of Software were employees of Move, Inc.
- 5.3 At all material times hereto, Move, Inc. knew or should have known, with reasonable investigation of their inappropriate conduct.
- 5.4 Move, Inc. failed to adequately supervise and control the inappropriate behavior of these individuals and others.
- 5.5 Defendant failed to prevent, remedy or reprimand the unlawful activities described above as perpetuated and participated in by supervisory personnel and other personnel of authority at Move, Inc.
 - 5.6 As plaintiff's employer, Move, Inc. had a duty to provide a safe workplace.
 - 5.7 Move, Inc. breached its duty to provide a safe workplace for plaintiff.
- 5.8 As a direct and proximate result of Move, Inc.'s failure to adequately supervise its employees, and its failure to take meaningful action within a reasonable time to correct the

atmosphere of harassment and to take reasonable action against the employees who participated in such harassment, plaintiff has been harmed in an amount to be proven at trial.

VI. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: WASHINGTON LAWS AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

- 6.1 Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference all the foregoing paragraphs of her Complaint as if fully set forth herein at length.
- 6.2 The above-described harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of RCW 49.60 et seq., and Washington common law.
- 6.3 Plaintiff was a victim of sexual harassment and age and gender discrimination by the defendant, which would not have occurred but for her sex and age. The harassment and discrimination was sufficiently pervasive so as to affect the terms, conditions and/or privileges of employment by creating an intimidating, hostile and offensive working environment that any woman would have found offensive. The actions made against plaintiff by defendant were due to plaintiff's gender and were not accidental, but were intentional, inappropriate, and demeaning in nature.
- 6.4 Defendant Move, Inc. knew, or should have known, of the hostile and offensive working environment created and sustained by its agents and employees, all of whom held a supervisory position at all times during the aforementioned harassment. Move, Inc. took no action against various employees and agents, and did nothing to stop the retaliatory actions taken against plaintiff after she provided supporting facts in the sexual harassment investigation.
- 6.5 Defendant Move, Inc. is strictly liable for the actions of its agents and employees, and it knew or should have known of the unlawful conduct, as its agents and were direct or tacit participants in the unlawful discriminatory and retaliatory acts. Defendant was negligent in failing to remedy, deter, or otherwise correct the unlawful discrimination and retaliation directed towards plaintiff, which was perpetuated, conducted and condoned by its own agents and employees. Such

inaction on the part of defendant constituted a reckless indifference to the protected rights of plaintiff.

- 6.6 The unlawful employment practices complained of above were intentional.
- 6.7 The unlawful employment practices complained of above were done with malice or with reckless indifference to the unprotected rights of the plaintiff.
- 6.8 As a result of defendant's unlawful employment practices, plaintiff has been harmed in an amount to be proven at trial.

VII. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION: INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

- 7.1 Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of plaintiff's Complaint as if set forth herein at length.
- 7.2 Defendant acted in conscious disregard of the high probability of causing emotional distress to plaintiff. Defendant knew, or should have known, there was a high degree of probability that emotional distress would result to plaintiff from the discriminatory and retaliatory conduct. Knowing this, defendant acted in conscious disregard of those probable results.
- 7.3 Defendant engaged in acts of sexual harassment and discrimination based upon gender and age, which caused plaintiff to suffer emotional distress and mental suffering. Defendant is liable for the intentional infliction of emotional distress and mental suffering incurred by the plaintiff in the past, present and future.
- 7.4 Defendant is vicariously liable under the doctrine of repondeat superior for its agent's actions that caused plaintiff to suffer emotional distress and mental suffering, and by way of its failure to take reasonably prompt and adequate corrective action calculated to end the discrimination and retaliation. Defendant is thus liable for the intentional infliction of emotional distress and mental suffering incurred by the plaintiff in the past, present and future.

VIII. <u>FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION: NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF</u> EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

- **8.1** Plaintiff herein incorporates the foregoing paragraph of plaintiff's Complaint as if set forth herein at length.
- 8.2 Defendant acted in a negligent disregard of the high probability of causing emotional distress to plaintiff in that defendant knew or should have known that there was a high degree of probability that emotional distress would result to plaintiff from the unwelcomed discrimination and retaliatory conduct. Knowing this, defendant acted in negligent disregard of those probable results.
- **8.3** Defendant acted negligently in its conduct, knowing that emotional distress would result to plaintiff from the discriminatory and retaliatory conduct. Knowing this, the defendant acted in conscious disregard.
- 8.4 Certain acts of harassment and retaliation engaged in by defendant's agents caused plaintiff to suffer emotional distress and mental suffering incurred by the plaintiff in the past, present, and future.

XII. SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION: WRONGFUL DISCHARGE

- 9.1 Plaintiff herein incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of plaintiff's complaint as if set forth herein at length.
 - 9.2 At all material times hereto, plaintiff was successfully employed by Move, Inc..
- 9.3 Plaintiff was wrongfully terminated from employment based upon plaintiff's exercise of statutorily protected rights, to wit, the reporting of and participation in a sexual harassment investigation.
- 9.4 Said termination was intentional and wrongful and violates the laws of the State of Washington and defendant's policies.
- 9.5 As a result of defendant's illegal conduct, plaintiff has been injured in an amount to be proven at trial.

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XIII. SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION: RETALIATION

- 10.1 Plaintiff herein incorporates the foregoing paragraphs to plaintiff's complaint as if set forth herein at length.
 - 10.2 At all material times hereto, plaintiff was successfully employed by Move, Inc..
- 10.3 Move, Inc. engaged in a pattern and practice of retaliating against the plaintiff for plaintiff's participation and support of coworkers' complaints of sexual harassment.
 - 10.4 Move, Inc. engaged in retaliatory acts including, but not limited discharge.
 - 10.5 Termination of employment is an adverse employment actions.
- 10.6 As a direct and proximate result of defendant's retaliatory conduct, plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.

XIV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, plaintiff Suzanne Z. Mueller respectfully requests that this Court:

- (1) Grant a permanent injunction enjoining defendant, his officers, successors, agents, assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from engaging in any employment practice which discriminates on the unlawful bases detailed above;
- (2) Order defendant to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs which provide equal employment opportunities for all employees, and which eradicate the effects of his past and present unlawful employment practices;
- (3) Order defendant to make plaintiff whole by providing appropriate back pay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of his unlawful employment practices;
- (4) Order defendant to make plaintiff whole by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful employment practices described in the above paragraphs, including out-of-pocket expenses, in amounts to be determined at trial;

- (5) Order defendant to make plaintiff whole by providing compensation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices complained of in the above paragraphs, including without limitation emotional pain, suffering, anguish, and loss of enjoyment of life, damage to reputation in amounts to be determined at trial;
- (6) Award plaintiff all of the recoverable costs of this action, attorneys' fees and prejudgment interest.
- (7) Grant any additional or further relief as provided by law which this Court finds appropriate, equitable, or just;

DATED this 17th day of August, 2020.

LASHER HOLZAPFEL SPERRY & EBBERSON, P.L.L.C.

By: s/ Robin Williams Phillips

Robin Williams Phillips, WSBA #17947 Attorney for Plaintiff Suzanne Z. Mueller

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Service of Process Transmittal

08/18/2020

CT Log Number 538114504

Jan Tomon MOVE, Inc. TO:

30700 Russell Ranch Rd., Suite 1000

Westlake Village, CA 91362

RE: **Process Served in California**

FOR: Move, Inc. (Domestic State: DE)

ENCLOSED ARE COPIES OF LEGAL PROCESS RECEIVED BY THE STATUTORY AGENT OF THE ABOVE COMPANY AS FOLLOWS:

TITLE OF ACTION: SUZANNE Z. MUELLER, PLTF. vs. MOVE, INC., DFT.

DOCUMENT(S) SERVED:

COURT/AGENCY: None Specified

Case # NONE

ON WHOM PROCESS WAS SERVED: C T Corporation System, Los Angeles, CA

DATE AND HOUR OF SERVICE: By Process Server on 08/18/2020 at 13:30

JURISDICTION SERVED: California

APPEARANCE OR ANSWER DUE: None Specified ATTORNEY(S) / SENDER(S): None Specified

ACTION ITEMS: CT has retained the current log, Retain Date: 08/18/2020, Expected Purge Date:

08/23/2020

Image SOP

Email Notification, Jan Tomon Jan.Tomon@move.com

C T Corporation System 1999 Bryan Street SIGNED:

ADDRESS:

Suite 900 Dallas, TX 75201

For Questions: 866-665-5799

SouthTeam2@wolterskluwer.com

Page 1 of 1 / AS

Information displayed on this transmittal is for CT Corporation's record keeping purposes only and is provided to the recipient for quick reference. This information does not constitute a legal opinion as to the nature of action, the amount of damages, the answer date, or any information contained in the documents themselves. Recipient is responsible for interpreting said documents and for taking appropriate action. Signatures on certified mail receipts confirm receipt of package only, not contents.



PROCESS SERVER DELIVERY DETAILS

Date: Tue, Aug 18, 2020

Server Name: judith smith

Location: Los Angeles, CA-LA

Entity Served Move, Inc. dba Move Holdings

Agent Name

Case Number N/A

Jurisdiction CA-LA



Case 2:20-cv-01374-RSM_Document 1-4_Filed 09/17/20 Page 1 of 1 CIVIL COVER SHEET

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil decket sheet.

purpose of initiating the civil d I. (a) PLAINTIFFS	ocket sheet. (SEE INSTRUC	TIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF TI	DEFENDANTS County of Residence of First Listed Defendant (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY) NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED. Attorneys (If Known)			
,	of First Listed Plaintiff XCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CA Address, and Telephone Numbe	,				
II. BASIS OF JURISDI	ICTION (Place an "X" in O	One Box Only)	I. CITIZENSHIP OF P	RINCIPAL PARTIES	(Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintif	
☐ 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff	U.S. Government			IF DEF 1 □ 1 Incorporated <i>or</i> Proof Business In T		
☐ 2 U.S. Government Defendant	☐ 4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)		Citizen of Another State	2		
			Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country	3	□ 6 □ 6	
IV. NATURE OF SUIT	(Place an "X" in One Box Only) TORTS		FORFEITURE/PENALTY	Click here for: Nature of Suit Code Descriptions. BANKRUPTCY OTHER STATUTES		
□ 110 Insurance □ 120 Marine □ 130 Miller Act □ 140 Negotiable Instrument □ 150 Recovery of Overpayment & Enforcement of Judgment □ 151 Medicare Act □ 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans (Excludes Veterans) □ 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veteran's Benefits □ 160 Stockholders' Suits □ 190 Other Contract □ 195 Contract Product Liability □ 196 Franchise REAL PROPERTY □ 210 Land Condemnation □ 220 Foreclosure □ 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment □ 240 Torts to Land □ 245 Tort Product Liability □ 290 All Other Real Property	PERSONAL INJURY 310 Airplane 315 Airplane Product Liability 320 Assault, Libel & Slander 330 Federal Employers' Liability 340 Marine 345 Marine Product Liability 350 Motor Vehicle Product Liability 360 Other Personal Injury 362 Personal Injury Medical Malpractice CIVIL RIGHTS 440 Other Civil Rights 441 Voting 442 Employment 443 Housing/ Accommodations 445 Amer. w/Disabilities - Employment 446 Amer. w/Disabilities - Other 448 Education	PERSONAL INJURY 365 Personal Injury - Product Liability 367 Health Care/ Pharmaceutical Personal Injury Product Liability 368 Asbestos Personal Injury Product Liability 368 Asbestos Personal Injury Product Liability 370 Other Fraud 371 Truth in Lending 380 Other Personal Property Damage 385 Property Damage 385 Property Damage 385 Property Damage Product Liability PRISONER PETITIONS Habeas Corpus: 463 Alien Detainee 510 Motions to Vacate Sentence 530 General 535 Death Penalty Other: 540 Mandamus & Other 550 Civil Rights 555 Prison Condition 560 Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement	☐ 625 Drug Related Seizure of Property 21 USC 881 ☐ 690 Other	□ 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 □ 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157 PROPERTY RIGHTS □ 820 Copyrights □ 830 Patent □ 835 Patent - Abbreviated New Drug Application □ 840 Trademark SOCIAL SECURITY □ 861 HIA (1395ff) □ 862 Black Lung (923) □ 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) □ 864 SSID Title XVI □ 865 RSI (405(g)) FEDERAL TAX SUITS □ 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) □ 871 IRS—Third Party 26 USC 7609	□ 375 False Claims Act □ 376 Qui Tam (31 USC	
	moved from 3 the Court Cite the U.S. Civil Sta	Appellate Court				
VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT: CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P.			DEMAND \$	DEMAND \$ CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint: JURY DEMAND: □ Yes □ No		
VIII. RELATED CASI	E(S) (See instructions):	JUDGE		DOCKET NUMBER		
DATE						
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY						
	MOUNT	APPLYING IFP	JUDGE	MAG. JUI	OGE	