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                      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                   ) No. CR 05-398-GAF
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              Plaintiff,
                                   ) GOVERNMENT'S OPPOSITION TO
                                     DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO
17
                                   ) PRECLUDE EVIDENCE OF
                  v.
                                   ) HOMESTORE'S REVENUE
18
    STUART H. WOLFF,
                                   ) RESTATEMENTS; MEMORANDUM OF
                                     POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
19
              Defendant.
                                   ) Hearing Date: December 15, 2008
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                                   ) Hearing Time: 1:30 p.m.
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        Plaintiff United States of America hereby opposes defendant
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   Stuart H. Wolff's motion in limine to preclude all evidence of
   Homestore's revenue restatements.
                                       The government will seek to
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   introduce limited evidence of the revenue restatements solely to
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establish the materiality of the information that defendant is

charged with concealing from Homestore's auditors. There is no

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better evidence that the concealed information was material than the fact that the company restated its revenue in order to eliminate the fraudulently inflated revenues. If defendant agrees to stipulate to the materiality element, then the government will not seek to introduce the revenue restatements. Absent a stipulation, however, the government has the right to introduce the restatements and brief testimony establishing their significance in order to demonstrate materiality.

This opposition is based on the attached memoranda of points 10 and authorities of the parties, and any argument at the hearing on this Motion.

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13 Dated: November 7, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

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CHRISTINE C. EWELL Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Criminal Division

/s/

MICHAEL J. RAPHAEL MICHAEL R. WILNER Assistant United States Attorneys

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1			TABLE OF CONTENTS	~_											
2			<u>PA</u> (<u>3E</u>											
3	I.	INTR	ODUCTION	1											
4	II.	FACTS													
5	III.	ARGUMENT - BECAUSE DEFENDANT IS CONTESTING THE MATERIALITY TO INVESTORS OF HOMESTORE'S OVERSTATED													
6		FINA	NCIAL STATEMENTS, THE COMPANY'S RESTATEMENTS ARE VANT AND ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT MAY												
			ODUCE TO DISCHARGE ITS BURDEN	6											
7 8		A.	Admission of the Restatements Does Not Violate Federal Rule of Evidence 407	8											
9		В.	The Testimony About Homestore's Decision to Restate												
10			Income Is Admissible Because It Will Come From Percipient Witnesses, and the Restatements Themselves												
11			Are Admissible As Business Records or As Trustworthy Documents	10											
12		C.	The Restatement Evidence Is Not Substantially More												
13				13											
14	IV.	CONC	LUSION	14											
15															
16															
17															
18															
19															
20															
21															
22															
23															
24															
25															
26															
27															
28			3												

1	<u>TABLE OF AUTHORITIES</u> PAGE(S)
2	
3	FEDERAL CASES
4	Brown v. Link Belt Corp., 565 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1977)
5	<u>Condus v. Howard Savings Bank</u> , 986 F. Supp. 914 (D.N.J. 1997)
6	<u>Freitag v. Ayers</u> ,
7	468 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2006)
8	Gauthier v. AMF Inc., 788 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1986)
10	<u>In re Air Crash Disaster</u> , 86 F.3d 498 (9th Cir. 1996)
11	<u>In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia,</u> 871 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1999)
12	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
13	In re Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
14	In re CIT Group, Inc., Securities Litigation, 349 F. Supp. 2d 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
15	In re Peritus Software Servs. Inc. Securities Litig.,
16	52 F. Supp. 2d 211 (D. Mass. 1999)
17	<u>In re Worldcom, Inc., Securities Litiq.</u> , 388 F. Supp. 2d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
18	Malone v. Microdyne Corp.,
19	26 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 1994) 9
20	<u>Pau v. Yosemite Park and Curry Co.</u> , 928 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1991)
21	PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler,
22	364 F.3d 671 (6th Cir. 2004)
23	United States v. Baxter,
24	492 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1975)
25	
26	
27	
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II

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1					<u>T</u>	ABL	E C	F	ΑU	THO	OR:	ΙT	ΙE	S	(C	ON	т.)								
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4	<u>Unit</u>	ed (States F.3d	v. I	Fra	zie O+k	<u>er</u> ,	i 20	1	100	. E \															11
5	TT L						1 C.	тг.	1	LЭЭ	(5)		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	11
6	UIIIL	931	States O F.3d	1368	3 (9th	n C	ir.	. 1	L99	0)															11
7	Unit		States																							1.0
8		16.	1 F.3d	545	(9	tn	Cli	r.	15	998	;)	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	12
9																										
10			RULES	400																						7.4
11			Evid.		•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	14
12			Evid.		•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		8-9
13			Evid.		•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		-11
14	Fed.	R.	Evid.	807	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	11	-12
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

During 2001, defendant Wolff and his co-conspirators inflated Homestore's financial statements through the use of fraudulent roundtrip deals. Those deals added approximately \$67 million in phony sales to Homestore's quarterly results. Following the full discovery of the scandal in early 2002 -- and several months after defendant Wolff and the other culpable parties left the company -- Homestore "restated" its results by filing corrected reports with the SEC that eliminated the bogus revenue from the company's financial statements.

Many of the criminal counts in the indictment require the government to prove the materiality of defendant's misconduct. For example, the government must prove that Homestore's quarterly filings with the SEC were overstated in a material amount (counts two through four), and that defendant Wolff lied to Homestore's auditors about material matters (counts ten through fourteen). In the original trial, defendant Wolff bitterly disputed that the revenue from the roundtrip deals was material to Homestore, even though that money represented a large percentage of Homestore's advertising revenue and overall revenue in 2001.

Proof that Homestore restated revenue from the roundtrip deals is strong, if not conclusive, evidence of its materiality, and it establishes the significance of the size of the revenue inflation scheme. Testimony and evidence regarding the restatement of this revenue is admissible for the limited purpose

(and with an appropriate limiting instruction from the Court) of determining the materiality of the revenue overstatement.

Defendant incorrectly asserts that this evidence is a "subsequent remedial measure" under Federal Rule of Evidence 407 intended to establish defendant's guilt here. That rule expressly allows for the admission of evidence for purposes other than proving culpability, and here the government will be admitting the evidence to prove materiality. Moreover, the restatement evidence is not a remedial measure taken by defendant, but rather one taken by Homestore, which is not a party to this case, so Rule 407's prohibition, meant to avoid deterring remedial measures, does not apply here.

Defendant's hearsay objection fares no better. The government intends to present testimony from Homestore's main auditor and a member of the company's Board of Directors. Both individuals are percipient witnesses with first-hand knowledge of Homestore's finances. Both can testify competently about the company's decision to eliminate the contested revenue from its restated financial statements. That is not hearsay evidence. The restated quarterly statements themselves are admissible under the business record exception to the hearsay rule, or the catchall exception for documents as trustworthy as those admissible under other exceptions.

Finally, evidence of Homestore's restatement of this revenue is not unduly prejudicial to the defense. Defendant's counsel has informed the government that defendant will be waiving his

right to jury trial. The government also will waive its right to jury trial. Consequently, because this case appears to be headed to a bench trial, the district court will be able to properly apply the evidence only for its proper purpose, and not in an unfairly prejudicial manner.

In any event, were there a jury trial, the government will agree to a limiting instruction, and it will also minimize the use of the evidence, tying it specifically to materiality in its opening statement and closing argument. Defendant is entitled to cross-examine the witnesses as to why the company restated revenue, or to argue that this evidence should not be persuasive. He further will be able to point to the limiting instruction in closing argument, and explain clearly to the jury that the restatements do not provide evidence of defendant's participation and knowledge in the fraud in 2001. But, having put the government to its proof on the question of whether the amount of phony revenue here is material, defendant cannot properly deprive the government of its best evidence of materiality.

II. FACTS

This is a corporate fraud case involving senior management of Homestore.com. The Indictment charges defendant Stuart Wolff, Homestore's former Chief Executive Officer, with participating in a conspiracy with other members of Homestore's management to inflate the company's reported financial results, and the Indictment also alleges defendant violated several other substantive securities laws.

The government intends to introduce trial evidence that will demonstrate that Homestore filed inaccurate quarterly reports with the SEC on Form 10-Q for the first three quarters of 2001. This evidence will come through several Homestore executives, who will testify that Homestore overstated its quarterly revenue by tens of millions of dollars in those filings.

At trial, the government will carry the burden of showing that the fraudulent revenue inflation scheme was material to investors. For this reason, the government will seek to introduce evidence that Homestore filed amended quarterly reports with the SEC in early 2002. Those quarterly reports restated Homestore's financial performance to delete revenue that the company previously reported from the bogus deals. The restatement evidence will support the government's position that the false information was material to investors. Indeed, when a public company amends or restates quarterly reports in an SEC filing, the restatement is publicly available, through the Internet and through other means, just like other corporate documents filed with the SEC.

In the prior trial, the government made only brief references to the restatements during the testimony of three witnesses, and the government again will limit the testimony in a similar manner in the upcoming trial. Barbara Alexander, a member of Homestore's board of directors, was directly involved

Defendant resigned from Homestore before then, and he neither participated in the decision to restate revenue, nor did he sign the amended financial statements.

in Homestore's decision to restate results, and her testimony regarding Homestore's restatement covered only five trial transcript pages. Richard Withey, the lead PWC accountant who audited Homestore, also directly participated in the restatements, and, at the prior trial, he responded to a few questions regarding specific transactions for which Homestore disavowed revenue it previously recognized. Withey also summarized the total amount of revenue that Homestore fraudulently recognized in 2001 (\$67 million) and later restated. Finally, Mark Rowen, an analyst with Prudential Securities, testified that Homestore's use of the phony 2001 revenue was significant information that he would have considered important in evaluating an investment in Homestore stock for his clients.²

The government will introduce the restated Homestore

Form 10-Qs into evidence as business records, and they will be

certified copies of publicly filed records.³ At no point during

the prior trial did the government ask any witness about the

contents of the exhibits, and the government does not intend to

do so at this trial. The restated reports were never displayed

to the jury. Finally, the government made only a brief reference

²² Former Chief Operating Officer John Giesecke and former Chief Financial Officer Joseph Shew -- both of whom pled guilty to conspiring with defendant to commit securities fraud -- testified about the general significance of a corporation

restified about the general significance of a corporation restating its results. However, neither executive testified about Homestore's actual restatement, which occurred after Giesecke and Shew had left the company.

The government introduced the documents during the testimony of an SEC representative; she did not testify about the contents of the restated reports.

to Homestore's restatement in opening statement and closing argument. In the current trial, the government intends to proceed in a substantially similar manner.

III. ARGUMENT

BECAUSE DEFENDANT IS CONTESTING THE MATERIALITY TO INVESTORS OF HOMESTORE'S OVERSTATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, THE COMPANY'S RESTATEMENTS ARE RELEVANT AND ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT MAY INTRODUCE TO DISCHARGE ITS BURDEN

If defendant were to choose to stipulate that the \$67 million in inflated revenue in Homestore's 2001 quarterly reports was material to investors, then the government would agree not to introduce evidence of Homestore's income restatements. On the other hand, if, as in the prior trial, defendant contests materiality, the government is entitled to present evidence of Homestore's restatement of revenue to discharge its burden of proving that Homestore's false statements were material to investors.

Defendant is charged with violations of the federal securities laws arising from the fraud scheme. The charged offenses require the government to prove that defendant caused Homestore to make materially false statements, which is a question of fact that "must be assessed from the perspective of the reasonable investor." <u>United States v. Berger</u>, 473 F.3d 1080, 1100 (9th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit has held that it is "self-evident" that the materiality of information regarding a public company's "financial condition, solvency, and profitability is not subject to serious challenge." <u>Berger</u>, 473

F.3d at 1103. If defendant accepts this proposition and stipulates to materiality, the government will not introduce the restatements, and defendant may avoid whatever prejudice (unfair or otherwise) that he believes would flow from the introduction of the evidence.

As in the prior trial, it appears that defendant again will not stipulate to materiality and wishes to attempt to establish that Homestore's inflated revenue was immaterial to investors. For this reason, the government is entitled to present evidence showing that Homestore's overstated financial statements were material to investors. If the amount of fictional revenue was, say, only a small fraction of Homestore's income, the company might have decided that the revised information was not important to investors. However, the bogus financial information here represented a major portion of the company's advertising revenue, causing Homestore's quarterly financial performance to exceed analyst expectations. The fact that the company restated its revenue is the best, and perhaps conclusive, evidence of materiality. PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 695 (6th Cir. 2004) ("a restatement is an admission that financial statements were materially false at the time they were made"); In re Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 474, 486-87 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Pursuant to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ('GAAP'), previously issued financial statements should be restated only to correct material accounting errors that existed at the time the statements were originally

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issued."); In re Peritus Software Servs. Inc. Securities Litig., 52 F. Supp. 2d 211, 223 (D. Mass. 1999) ("after-the-fact accounting admissions may suffice to show that material misstatements occurred in the financial statements").

A. <u>Admission of the Restatements Does Not Violate Federal</u> Rule of Evidence 407

Defendant claims that the restatements are inadmissible as a subsequent remedial measure under Fed. R. Evid. 407. This is incorrect, as that Rule provides affirmative authority to admit the restatement evidence to prove materiality in this case.

Rule 407 provides that

evidence of the subsequent [remedial] measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in the product, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.

Fed. R. Evid. 407 (emphasis added); see also Rule 407, comment to 1997 amendment ("Although this amendment adopts a uniform federal rule, it should be noted that evidence of subsequent remedial measures may be admissible pursuant to the second sentence of Rule 407."); Wright & Graham, 23 Federal Practice & Procedure:

Federal Rules of Evidence § 5290 (2008) ("The list of permissible uses in Rule 407 is illustrative, not exclusive; evidence of subsequent repairs may be admitted for any purpose that does not require an inference to the negligence or culpable conduct of the repairer.")

In this trial, the government will not seek to admit Homestore's restatements in order to prove defendant's knowledge of, and participation in, the criminal scheme at Homestore, and the restatements in fact do not constitute such proof. resigned from Homestore following the discovery of the fraud scheme, and well before new management filed the corrected reports. Rather, the government will seek to admit the restatements, and limit any testimony and argument about them, for the sole purpose of demonstrating materiality. This purpose falls squarely within the authorization in Rule 407's second sentence for the introduction of evidence of remedial measures for purposes other than proving culpable conduct. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster, 86 F.3d 498, 531 (9th Cir. 1996) (evidence of subsequent remedial design changes admissible to rebut witness's claim that product was "state of the art"); Brown v. Link Belt Corp., 565 F.2d 1107, 1109 n.2 (9th Cir. 1977) (evidence of subsequent changes to a product proves feasibility of changes without showing negligence or culpability). restatement evidence is admissible pursuant to the rule.

In any event, Rule 407 does not preclude admission of evidence of the restatements, because the government is not offering an admission of misconduct by a party to this case. Pau v. Yosemite Park and Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 887-88 (9th Cir. 1991) (Rule 407 prohibits only evidence of remedial measures by a defendant, as a non-defendant will not be deterred from taking remedial measures due to the admission of such evidence); In re

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Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, 871 F.2d 812, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); Malone v. Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d 471, 480 (4th Cir. 1994) (limiting the use of correction to financial statements offered against corporation-defendant); In re CIT Group, Inc., Securities Litigation, 349 F. Supp. 2d 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (same restriction). The purpose of Rule 407 is to avoid deterring subsequent remedial measures, Gauthier v. AMF Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 1986), but here there is no such concern, since Homestore, not defendant, remedied the false financial statements. The restatements are to be admitted against defendant, not Homestore, the party that corrected its fraudulent financial statements.

B. The Testimony About Homestore's Decision to Restate

Income Is Admissible Because It Will Come From

Percipient Witnesses, and the Restatements Themselves

Are Admissible As Business Records or As Trustworthy

Documents

Relevant evidence of (i) Homestore's decision to restate results and (ii) the amended Form 10-Q quarterly filings with the SEC is admissible. Two percipient witnesses with knowledge about Homestore's finances (PWC auditor Withey and Homestore boardmember Alexander) will testify from personal knowledge that Homestore restated its financial results in early 2002. Both are competent to explain what they did and knew when Homestore filed the corrected quarterly reports.

The restated reports themselves are reliable business records that fall under the exception to the hearsay rule in Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). See In re Worldcom, Inc., Securities Litig.,

388 F. Supp. 2d 319, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (corporation's restatement of income ruled an admissible business record) (analysis provided in In re Worldcom, Inc., Securities Litig., 2005 WL 375313 *6-*10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2005)). A business record is admissible if: (1) made by a person at a regularly conducted business activity with knowledge at or near the time of the information recorded; and (2) kept in the regular course of the business activity. See United States v. Ray, 930 F.3d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1990). Such business records are "afforded a presumption of reliability and trustworthiness that the defendants failed to rebut." Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 541 n.5 (9th Cir. 2006). "[F]inancial reports and audits are admissible under Rule 803(6)" even if prepared in advance of litigation so long as they are reliable and trustworthy. Condus v. Howard Savings Bank, 986 F. Supp. 914, 918 (D.N.J. 1997). The test of admissibility is "not the motivation of the employee preparing the record, but the function served by the records in the operation itself." <u>United States v. Baxter</u>, 492 F.2d 150, 165 (9th Cir. 1975). The key criteria are whether the report "had business significance" apart from the litigation, and is the type of report "upon which independent business decisions are routinely made." Condus, 986 F. Supp. at 919; see also United States v. Frazier, 53 F.3d 1105, 1110 (10th Cir. 1995) (Department of Labor report following fraud disclosure admissible as it "had business significance" apart from use in prosecution).

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Even if the restatements did not qualify under the business record exception, they are admissible under the "catch-all" exception to the hearsay rule, Fed. R. Evid. 807. Such evidence is admissible if it possesses "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to the listed exceptions to the hearsay rule." <u>United States v. Sanchez-Lima</u>, 161 F.3d 545, 547 (9th Cir. 1998). The evidence must also: (1) relate to a material fact; (2) be more probative on the point than any other evidence that can be procured through reasonable efforts; and (3) serve the general purposes of the rules of evidence and the interests of justice. <u>Id</u>.

The Homestore restated financial statements qualify for admission under either evidentiary rule. As a public company, Homestore was under a statutory obligation to file accurate quarterly reports. During trial, Homestore's former executives and outside auditor will explain the significance of the company's quarterly filings and the process for submitting them. While the filing of these amended reports was an event out of the ordinary, the documents themselves were identical in form and content to other quarterly reports that Homestore regularly prepared. Defendant cannot credibly claim that there was anything untrustworthy about the restated financial statements. Under the circumstances, the restatements contained reliable and probative proof of the materiality of the overstated revenue from the fraudulent roundtrip deals.

C. <u>The Restatement Evidence Is Not Substantially More</u> Prejudicial Than Probative

As defendant has recently informed the government that he will be waiving jury trial, and as the government also will consent to a bench trial, there will be no concern that a jury will be unfairly prejudiced by the restatements or the testimony about them in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The Court, of course, will be able to separate the evidentiary purpose of the evidence (to demonstrate the materiality of the suppressed information about the fraudulent deals) from the issue on which defendant believes he could be unfairly prejudiced (Homestore's admission that it overstated revenue due to fraud).

Regardless of who is the trier-of-fact, the government will be using the restatements solely to establish that the revenue reported in Homestore's 2001 quarterly reports was materially overstated. Defendant would be able to avoid any prejudice (unfair or otherwise) from the restatements by simply stipulating to the materiality of the \$67 million in phony sales that Homestore booked in 2001. With such a stipulation, the government would agree not to elicit any restatement evidence.

Even if this case were to proceed before a jury, the government will agree to a limiting instruction that would ensure that the jury will not consider the restatement evidence for any purpose other than proving materiality. Furthermore, as in the prior trial, the government will minimize the possibility of any unfair prejudice by keeping the restatement evidence to a minor role at trial, and will ask witnesses only a handful of questions

about the restatements and make only brief mentions of them in opening statements and closing arguments, tying each reference to proof of materiality. Defendant, in turn, is welcome to point the jury to the limiting instruction in his closing argument, and explain that the timing of the 2002 restatements shows that they do not bear on defendant's culpability in 2001. With these precautions, the probative nature of the restatement evidence clearly is not "substantially outweighed" by the danger of unfair prejudice, Fed. R. Evid. 403.

IV. CONCLUSION

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For the reasons set forth above, the government respectfully requests that the Court deny defendant's motion in limine to preclude evidence of revenue restatements.

Dated: November 7, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

THOMAS P. O'BRIEN
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